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Ebola: towards an International Health Systems Fund
The international response to the current outbreak of 
Ebola virus in west Africa, which is projected to infect 
about 20 000 people with a case fatality rate of more than 
50%,1,2 has been fractured and delayed. The index case 
(a 2-year-old boy from Guinea) died in December, 2013, 
followed by confirmed Ebola clusters on March 22, 2014, 
which quickly spread to Liberia and then Sierra Leone. The 
disease jumped to Nigeria through air travel, and, recently, 
to Senegal. Yet WHO did not declare a Public Health 
Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC) until Aug 8, 
2014, and only released an Ebola response roadmap on 
Aug 28—5 months after international spread.2 WHO 
must now raise funds to implement the roadmap, which 
will further delay a robust international response. This 
tragedy could have been averted and, with more than 
20 outbreaks of Ebola since 1976, the need for public 
health preparedness should have been foreseen.
This is the first Ebola outbreak to engulf major urban 
areas, with intense patterns of transmission. If the 
affected countries had adequate public health systems 
that were able to rapidly identify cases, trace contacts, 
and isolate infected and exposed patients, they probably 
would have contained Ebola within rural settings. The 
countries most affected by Ebola, however, rank lowest 
in global development, lacking essential public health 
infrastructure, the most basic of which is an adequate 
health workforce. WHO estimates a shortage of 
7·2 million doctors, nurses, and midwives globally,3 with 
the countries most affected by Ebola among the worst off.
The crisis has depleted affected countries of their 
already scarce human resources: more than 130 health 
workers have died from Ebola.4 Even before the loss 
of lives, Liberia and Sierra Leone had only about 
90 and 136 doctors, respectively.5,6 Liberia would need 
the present number of skilled health professionals to 
increase by about ten times—in Sierra Leone’s case by 
nearer 20 times—to meet even a minimum threshold 
for an adequate health workforce.3,7 Guinea is only 
marginally better off, with fewer than 1000 doctors 
for a population of more than 11 million people. The 
loss of nurses, too, will have long-term repercussions. 
At one Sierra Leone hospital, for example, 15 nurses 
have died among 22 total health workers,8 with only 
three nurses avoiding infection; the country barely had 
1000 nurses before the outbreak.6
Hospitals in affected countries have become 
amplification points for transmission, since they do not 
have rigorous infection control, personal protective 
equipment, and safe or sterile isolation facilities. 
Consequently, fearful patients have avoided hospitals, 
thus spreading Ebola infection in the community with 
individuals left untreated for myriad other health 
hazards, ranging from malaria and chronic disease to 
childbirth.9,10 Community health workers similarly fear 
Ebola, often refusing to examine patients and collect 
blood and urine samples.
The health infrastructure needed to prevent an initial 
outbreak from burgeoning out of control—precisely what 
has happened—remains out of the reach of low-income 
countries. The affected states do not have adequate 
community, laboratory, public health, and clinical 
personnel; infection-control equipment, supplies, and 
protocols; health worker training; laboratory facilities 
with high biosafety capabilities; health facilities, including 
safe isolation units; and communication systems that can 
effectively deliver important public health information. 
Affected countries have instead often resorted to 
military-led cordon sanitaires to separate large segments 
of the population without ensuring access to basic 
necessities, such as food, clean water, and health care.
The failure to build health-system capacity violates 
the 2005 International Health Regulations (IHR),11 
which require countries to develop capabilities to detect, 
assess, report, and respond to global health emergencies. 
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196 states are parties to the IHR, yet many still do not 
possess the requisite core health-system capacities. 
Article 44 of the IHR requires states to mobilise financial 
resources and provide technical and logistical support 
to develop, strengthen, and maintain public health 
capacity. Yet WHO has no dedicated funds for IHR 
capacity building, with high-income countries failing to 
meet their IHR obligations to help build health systems. 
Despite an increasing number of deaths and regional 
spread of Ebola in west Africa, a major international 
response did not occur until two American aid workers 
and a Spanish Priest became infected; even then, public 
attention was diverted by ethical concerns over the 
compassionate use of experimental drugs for Ebola—
endorsed by WHO on Aug 11. However, drugs that have 
never been tested for safety in human beings, and are 
in extremely scarce supply, could never have contained 
the outbreak. Although development of effective 
vaccines and treatments for Ebola should be a global 
priority, the Ebola crisis could offer a unique opportunity 
to transform international health assistance towards 
sustainable health systems. Weak health systems 
represent an enduring and systemic problem not only 
for global health security, but also for the prevention 
and control of diseases across the spectrum—both 
infectious and non-communicable. 
How could this Ebola outbreak have been averted and 
what could states and the international community do 
to prevent the next epidemic? The answer is not untested 
drugs, mass quarantines, or even humanitarian relief. 
If the real reasons the outbreak turned into a tragedy of 
these proportions are human resource shortages and 
fragile health systems, the solution is to fix these inherent 
structural deficiencies. A dedicated International Health 
Systems Fund at WHO would rebuild broken trust, with 
the returns of longer, healthier lives and economic 
development far exceeding the costs. This fund would 
encompass both emergency response capabilities and 
enduring health-system development.
WHO’s Ebola response roadmap2 estimates that an 
initial US$490 million in global resources over 6 months 
would be needed to curb the outbreak, although the total 
costs are likely to be considerably higher. Yet in 2011 a 
WHO Review Committee on the Functioning of IHR 
proposed the establishment of a Global Health Emergency 
Workforce, backed by a $100 million contingency fund for 
surge capacity to be mobilised for a declared PHEIC.12 A well 
designed emergency workforce should comprise trained 
health professionals with experience in low-resource 
settings prepared for rapid deployment, and coordinated 
by WHO in partnership with national governments.
If contingency funding were in place, WHO would 
have had a strong incentive to declare an international 
emergency in a timely way. WHO did not, however, act 
on the Review Committee’s recommendations, even 
though the proposed surge capacity fund would be 
affordable—representing less than 0·5% of international 
health assistance.13 WHO itself, which is plagued by 
severe financial troubles at a time of reform with 
no control over two-thirds of its budget, is not in a 
position to develop the fund in the absence of financial 
commitments from high-income states.14
A dedicated International Health Systems Fund 
would build national capacities not only to respond 
rapidly to public health emergencies, but also to enable 
low-income and some middle-income countries to 
deliver comprehensive health services. Governments 
themselves would be expected to allocate domestic 
funds, and fulfil the 2001 Abuja Declaration pledge by 
African heads of state to allocate at least 15% of national 
budgets to the health sector. A sustainable International 
Health Systems Fund would help low-income and some 
middle-income countries to build capacity to serve their 
entire populations.
The scale of a sustainable International Health 
Systems Fund, however, would require multibillion 
dollar investment channelled to low-income countries, 
thus mobilising the resources envisioned in the IHR, 
together with a right-to-health-based universal health 
coverage. Although the scale of investment would 
be substantial, political support could be marshalled 
with social mobilisation, just as occurred with AIDS 
through the US President’s Emergency Plan for 
AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) and the Global Fund to Fight 
AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria.15
The west African Ebola epidemic could spark a badly 
needed global course correction that would favour 
strong health infrastructure. Sustainable funding 
scalable to needs for enduring health systems is a wise 
and affordable investment. It is in all states’ interests 
to contain health hazards that may eventually travel 
to their shores. But beyond self-interest are the 
imperatives of health and social justice—a humanitarian 
response that would work, now and for the future.
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